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Abstract
Examines what avenues are open to establish a legal procedure to ensure compensation for
parties injured as the result of accidents caused by offshore drilling rigs. Concludes that there is a
need to impose strict liability standard on those parties engaged in offshore drilling for damages
caused by such activities.
THE CAMPECHE BAY BLOW-OUT: A
STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH TO
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM OFFSHORE
DRILLING ACCIDENTS
INTRODUCTION
On June 3, 1979, in the Bay of Campeche in the Gulf of
Mexico, an exploratory well under the operational guidance of the
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) company suffered a severe blow-
out.1 Since that date, experts have estimated that the runaway well
discharged from 10,000 to 30,000 barrels of oil per day2 which
poses a serious threat to the surrounding marine environment. 3 Al-
though massive efforts were made to alleviate this constant source
of pollution, 4 the capping of the well was not completed for over
1. 125 CONG. REC. E4437-38 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1979) (remarks of Rep.
Skelton) [hereinafter cited as Skelton Remarks].
2. Seib & Schlender, Fighting the Slick, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
3. The following is a pictorial description of the threat to the marine environ-
ment:
The small helicopter banks away from an oil-blackened beach and
whisks out over the Gulf of Mexico, dipping lower to give its passengers a
close look at the water.
As far as they can see, the sea is shiny with a sheen of light oil that has
travelled northward 600 miles from a runaway Mexican oil well. Thick
brown ribbons of heavy crude oil are laced through the green water like
chocolate through a marble cake. The whole mess is headed for the beach,
where oil has already turned waves the color of chocolate milk.
id.
4. The first attempts at capping the well were performed by the Red Air Com-
pany of Houston. Although they met with initial success, the company finally aban-
doned the project after another uncapping of the well saying that "only a relief well
driven into the oil formation from another direction would be likely to get the pres-
sure down acceptably." This is a very difficult procedure because of the near zero
visibility caused by escaping oil near the well head making it practically impossible
to pinpoint where in the formation the relief wells should be drilled. One expert has
been quoted as saying, "well-drilling is not as exact as shooting a rifle. Those wells
could miss the formation and fail completely to relieve the pressure. That would
mean starting from scratch." N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, at A18, cols. 3-5.
Another attempt to cap the well was made by Petroleos Mexicanos, with help
from an American contractor, Brown and Root of Houston. They attempted to place a
funnel over the blown well to pull off the oil before subsequently burning it harm-
lessly. The funnel, nicknamed " 'sombrero,' is an octagonal steel cone 40 feet in di-
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nine months. Even the presence of international experts, many of
whom are experienced in dealing with oil pollution caused by
various mishaps, did not result in an immediate thwarting of the
continuous flow of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.5 Various opinions
were rendered for the inexplicable failure to cap the IXTOC I
well, 6 but most experts agree on one major point: the blow-out of
IXTOC I has caused the worst oil spill ever known to mankind. 7
There are two issues which arise out of this scenario. The first
concerns who should be held liable for the damages inflicted by
the oil pollution from the well. To address this problem it is rele-
vant that the company Petroleos Mexicanos, the party who subcon-
ameter and weighing 310 tons." Unfortunately, before the sombrero operation was
about to commence, the heavy steel supporter used to keep it in place broke and the
project had to be sent back to Houston for repairs. Id. at A18, cols. 5-6.
5. One of the reasons for the difficulty in capping the blown well was the gen-
eral unpreparedness of the Mexican company to handle a spill of such magnitude.
The Mexicans have recieved help from abroad, however, and the clean up crew was
likened to a small army of men and equipment. Oil spill control companies from four
countries-the United States, Britain, Norway, and France-have lent the Mexicans
large amounts of equipment in hopes of stemming the continuous tide of crude oil.
Seib & Schlender, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
The well was finally capped on March 23, 1980 after an estimated 3.1 million
barrels of oil were lost. N.Y. Times, March 24, 1980, at Al, col. 1.
6. Some of the outside experts say that Mexico has been lax at handling the
oil. Mr. Mohn of Norway, for example, says that Mexican officials instructed
him to shut down his company's two skimmers at 6 each night so that Mexi-
can crew members could comply with labor regulations forbidding them to
work more than 10 hours a day .... You don't ask the fire brigade to go
home from a fire just because it's 6 o'clock."
Seib & Schlender, supra note 2, at 1, col. 1.
A French expert, Jacques Pichon, inventor of an oil skimmer, was dismayed to
find inadequate facilities to store the scooped lip oil. When asked to train Mexican
crews on how the skimmers worked, Pichon had to demonstrate without an accompa-
nying barge, thus spraying oil from in front of the skimmer right back in the ocean
behind the skimmer.
And one American, Roy Hann, a professor of engineering at Texas A&M has
stated when asked why the so-called experts were unable to cap the well sooner,
that, "Everybody who's been hired by Mexico has been kissed off." Id. at 19, col. 1.
7. Id. However, prior to the capping, these experts pointed out in Mexico's de-
fense that:
Oil is spilling from the well under pressure never before encountered in the
Gulf of Mexico; such high pressure hinders the capping of the well. Not
only has a great amount of oil been spilled-more than the 1.6 million bar-
rels lost when the supertanker Amoco Cadiz cracked open in the English
Channel in 1978 and caused the previous largest spill-but it is especially
difficult to pick tip.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tracted the drilling to Pemargo,8 is a state-owned corporation. 9
Thus any suits which may be brought might ultimately result in
the Mexican government being required to compensate those in-
jured.10 After the Mexican government was confronted with this
possibility, its President, Jose Lopez Portillo adopted an adamant
position refusing to consider compensation.' The second and more
important issue to be addressed concerns what theory of liability
should be utilized to resolve the dispute. Should a theory of strict
liability be imposed on the wrongdoers or must an injured party
pursue the traditional route of establishing a negligence claim? The
question of liability for injuries caused by offshore drilling accidents
uncovers a vacuum in international law.1 2 The major sources of in-
ternational law 13 deal mainly with oil pollution caused by vessels,
thus leaving the question of liability for offshore drilling accidents
unanswered. 14
Although this may be a new field for regulation under interna-
tional law, the problem of state responsibility for pollution caused
by an offshore drilling accident is nevertheless an important one to
resolve. The need for developing rules in this area is twofold: to
resolve the specific issues involved in the Campeche Bay blow-out
and to establish legal procedures to govern similar events in the fu-
ture. Specifically, the Campeche Bay blow-out and the subsequent
8. Letter from Douglas G. Caroom, Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas,
to author (Jan. 18, 1980) (copy on file at the office of the FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL
LAW FORUM).
9. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
10. For the purpose of this Note, it will be assumed that the Campeche Bay
blow-out will take the form of an international dispute between the United States
and Mexico as sovereign states representing the interests of their nationals. It is true,
however, that an American company, Sedco Inc., sold the rig which may have been
defective to PEMEX and thus, Sedco as well as other private parties will be in-
volved in any action. This Note, however, is using the Campeche Bay blow-out as an
illustration of the dangers of offshore drilling and will not address the procedural as-
pects regarding joinder of necessary parties and determining the appropriate forum.
11. N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, at Al, col. 1.
12. Congressional studies have been conducted to establish grounds to hold
Mexico liable for the spill and this research has resulted in a finding that existing
treaties indicate that oil well mishaps are not covered. Skelton Remarks, supra note
1, at E4437-38.
13. Bilateral and Multilateral Treaties, Customary International Law, and Gen-
eral Principles of Civilized Nations are three of the major sources of international
law. J. BmERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56-63 (6th ed. 1963).
14. Skelton Remarks, supra note 1, at E4437-38. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(1976) (U.S. Government provisions on oil spill damage from rigs).
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damage to the Texas shore have been the source of great contro-
versy15 even though the pollution problem in this incident is local-
ized to the coastal shore of Texas. If, in fact, this dispute concern-
ing compensation for pollution-related injuries rises to the level of
a state-to-state conflict between the United States and Mexico, the
decision in such a case would be influential in the resolution of in-
cidents concerning similar extraterritorial injuries in the future.
The possibility of similar pollution problems caused by offshore
drilling mishaps is not to be taken lightly in lieu of the Campeche
Bay blow-out and the seemingly endless expansion of companies
into offshore drilling operations. 16
The purpose of this Note is to examine what avenues are open
to establish a legal procedure to ensure compensation for parties
injured as the result of accidents caused by offshore drilling rigs.
Part I focuses on the history of strict liability and the modern prin-
ciples which make certain activities abnormally dangerous and thus
appropriate subjects for a strict liability standard. Part II examines
prior international disputes with an emphasis on whether a strict li-
ability standard has been accepted by the international community.
Given the fact that offshore drilling is a relatively unregulated ac-
tivity, Part III analyzes the analogous problem of oil pollution
caused by vessel discharge. This Note concludes that there is a
need to impose a standard of strict liability on those parties en-
gaged in offshore drilling for damages caused by such activities.
15. Political fallout from the spill has spread to Texas almost as fast as the oil.
The rig used in the drilling of the well was a product of Sedco Inc., a Dallas based
company founded by W.P. Clements Jr., now the state's governor. Although Clem-
ents has tried to disassociate himself from the company by putting his interest in a
blind trust, many Texans believe that there is a strong link between the company,
now run by the Governor's son and the Governor himself.
After the spill had washed up along the shores of Texas, the Governor angered
many Texans by initially calling the spill "much to-do about nothing" and by telling
Mexicans that it would be "silly" for the United States or Texas to sue to recover
damages. Seib & Schlender, supra note 2, at 19, cols. 1-2.
16. "Nevertheless, experts from many countries feel that the Ixtoc I experience
will be valuable in future submarine gushers. The whole trend in oil exploration ap-
pears to be toward offshore and even deep-water reserves, and more major accidents
seem inevitable." N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1979, at A18, col. 6. For a discussion of the
probable increases in offshore drilling operations, see Nanda & Stiles, Offshore Oil
Spills: An Evaluation of Recent United States Responses, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 519
(1970).
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I. THE STRICT LIABILITY APPROACH
A. History
The concept of strict liability was formulated in the famous
English case, Rylands v. Fletcher,17 which held a landowner strictly
liable for damage to his neighbor's property caused by water
escaping from a reservoir constructed on the landowner's property.
In Rylands, there was no evidence of an intentional trespass
or any negligence on the part of the defendant. Rather, the court
emphasized that the non-natural use of one's property would lead
to liability although there was neither the intention to do harm nor
any negligence on the part of the defendant.' In the United
States, this doctrine has been modified by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts.19 Today, the general principle regarding strict liabil-
ity is as follows:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is sub-
ject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of an-
other resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possi-
bility of which makes the activity abnormally dangerous. 20
The Restatement (Second) continues by enumerating six factors
which should be considered to determine if an activity is classified
as abnormally dangerous. 21 Once an activity is classified as abnor-
mally dangerous, fault for injuries proximately caused by the activ-
ity becomes irrelevant.
17. L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
18. L.R. 3 H.L. at 339-40.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1976).
20. Id. § 519.
21. Id. § 520 lists the following factors in determining if an activity is abnor-
mally dangerous:
(a). existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b). likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c). inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d). extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e). inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried oil; and
(f). extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its danger-
ous attributes.
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B. Offshore Drilling: An Abnormally Dangerous Activity
The issue of whether a strict liability standard should be ap-
plied for pollution caused by an offshore drilling mishap turns on
whether offshore drilling is an abnormally dangerous activity. Since
the Santa Barbara Oil Spill2 2 and several blow-outs in the Gulf of
Mexico,2 3 there have been many suggestions made that offshore
drilling olerations should be restricted and possibly even prohib-
ited.2 4 In determining whether offshore drilling is suitable to be
grouped in the abnormally dangerous category, it is appropriate to
examine the activity in light of the Restatement (Second) factors. 2 5
The first group of factors to be analyzed focus on the nature of
the risk involved--i.e., the degree of risk of harm, the likelihood
that harm will result, and the inability to remove the risk.2 6 First,
as many offshore explorations involve unknown quantities of crude
oil, the degree of risk in the event of an accident is relatively high.
Although studies have shown that the degree of risk varies de-
pending upon the location, time, and concentration of the oil
spill,2 7 there is no evidence that even the slightest oil spill is bene-
ficial to the environment. Second, the likelihood of harm, is best
exemplified by the Santa Barbara Oil Spill.2 8 When oil, a toxic
agent,2 9 is thrust into the marine environment in large quantities,
it is likely that ocean life will be harmed. 30 Third, the inability to
22. See 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 10, 1969, at 50.
23. For an account of these blow-outs, see e.g., 68 OIL & GAS J., Jan. 19, 1970,
at 23; 67 OIL & GAS J., March 31, 1969, at 40.
24. See Krueger, International and National Regulation of Pollution From Off-
shore Production, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 541, 558 (1970).
25. In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in
Clauses (a) to (f) of this Section are all to be considered, and are all of importance.
Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient in itself in a particular case, and ordi-
narily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not
necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 520, comment f at 37 (1976).
26. See note 21 supra.
27. See Weller, Oil: Its Properties and Environmental Effects, in ASSESSING
THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF OIL SPILLS 115 (G. Enk ed. 1974).
28. E.g., a damage suit in the amount of $1.3 billion dollars was filed against
Union, the oil company involved in the offshore drilling at Santa Barbara for injuries
caused by the blow-out. See R. EASTON, BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL
SPILL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 77 (1972).
29. Weller, supra note 27, at 115.
30. For an excellent overview of the effects of oil discharge from vessels and its
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lessen the risk by use of reasonable care, is debatable. Many oil-
men have maintained that their safeguards31 at the sites have re-
duced the possibility of blow-outs and statistics 32 seem to lend sup-
port to this claim. To counter this argument, however, one can
examine the events following the Campeche Bay blow-out and
then ask whether merely minimizing the occurrence of spills is suf-
ficient in light of the possible havoc caused by one spill. To analo-
gize, nations have taken steps to minimize the risks caused by pos-
sible nuclear accidents, 33 yet these precautions are not sufficient to
take that activity out of the realm of being abnormally dangerous.
The second group of factors to be examined in the determina-
tion of whether offshore drilling should be classified as abnormally
dangerous focus on the community aspects-i.e., whether the activ-
ity is one of common usage, appropriateness of the location and the
utility of the activity balanced against the risk. 34 Although offshore
drilling operations have greatly expanded, 35 it is doubtful that
these increases are sufficient to enable offshore drilling to be con-
sidered an activity of common usage. Increased usage in and of it-
self does not make drilling an activity one of common usage because
of the interplay of the other factors. 36 By comparison, increased
usage in the automobile coupled with vast improvements in safety
standards enabled driving automobiles to be taken out of the cate-
gory of abnormally dangerous. 37 Unlike automobiles, however, the
effects on the marine environment, see R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, POLLUTION,
POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 28-38 (1979). Although it is true that tankers
carry different grades of oil than oil taken directly from the ocean floor, the similari-
ties in the overall effect make such a comparison worthwhile.
31. The principal safeguard used to prevent blow-outs is drilling mud which is
continuously circulated to the bottom of the well to reduce pressure. Seib &
Schlender, supra note 2, at 19, col. 2.
32. A United States Geological Survey says that about 16,000 wells have been
drilled in federal waters since 1956 and that only eight blow-outs have been so large
as to dump more than 100 barrels of oil. Id.
33. E.g., Proposed Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (H.R. 18
was designed to improve licensing procedures as a safeguard against possible envi-
ronmental disasters).
34. See note 21 supra.
35. See note 16 supra.
36. See note 25 supra.
37. The following are two early cases which held that automobiles are not ab-
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nature of offshore drilling prohibits it from becoming commonly used
because of the high levels of technology involved. The next consid-
eration is the appropriateness of the activity to the place where it
is conducted. There is no doubt that as land sites used for oil drill-
ing begin to dry up, tapping of unknown quantities of oil off coastal
shores will become necessary. Perhaps, however, the location of
these offshore wells should be evaluated beforehand at length to
minimize the effect of possible future accidents. It is true that the
public need to have greater exploration and exploitation of oil is
great, but it should be remembered that the dangers incident to
the operation are characteristic of the drilling itself, not of the land
where the drilling occurs. 38 Finally, the last and probably most im-
portant factor to be analyzed is the balancing of the risk threatened
with the utility of the activity. With the current societal dependence
on oil and without sufficient alternative energy resources it seems
likely that expansion will continue. In light of such disasters as the
Santa Barbara spill 39 and the various blow-outs in the Gulf of
Mexico,40 however, it is appropriate to advocate that the companies
involved in offshore drilling at least should be held to a higher
standard of liability if such activities, in fact, result in pollution of
the marine environment.
In further support of this argument, there is one relevant state
court case, Green v. General Petroleum Corporation4  which
treats oil drilling as an abnormally dangerous activity and thus an
appropriate subject for a strict liability standard. In Green, the
plaintiffs brought an action to recover damages for injuries to their
property as the result of the blowing-out of an oil well on defend-
ant's property.4 2 Similar to the ex gratia payments made by the
United States to Japan in 1955, 43 the plaintiffs utilized the tradi-
tional doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas4 as a rationale
for imposing liability. The defendants, however, asserted that
normally dangerous: Wing v. London General Omnibus Co. [1909] 2 K.B. 652;
Phillips v. Britannia Hygenic Laundry Co. [19231 1 K.B. 539.
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 520, comment
i at 39-40 (1976).
39. See note 22 supra.
40. See note 23 supra.
41. 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928).
42. Id. at 330, 270 P. at 952.
43. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
44. The literal translation is "use your own property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1238 (5th ed. 1979).
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"there were no preliminary indications that a 'blow-out' was immi-
nent, and that the well was the 'wildest' ever encountered by its
drillers in their experience.'"4 5 The Supreme Court of California
sided with the plaintiffs' argument and affirmed the doctrine of
strict liability for injuries to the plaintiffs' property occasioned by
the blowing-out of an oil well during drilling operations by the de-
fendant.46 It is true that the oil drilling in Green was conducted on
land but in spite of this distinguishing factor the practice of drilling
offshore does not appear to be any less hazardous. The following
statement in Green is particularly applicable to the present dispute
involving the offshore operations at Campeche Bay:
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise
lawful and proper in itself, deliberately does an act under known
conditions, and, with knowledge that injury may result to an-
other, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as the direct
and proximate consequence of the act, however carefully done,
the one who does the act and causes the injury should, in all
fairness, be required to compensate the other for damage
done. 47
With this precedent in Green, the classification of offshore drilling
as an abnormally dangerous activity subject to strict liability
standards seems to be proper.
II. PRIOR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES CONCERNING
STATE RESPONSIBILITY
A. Background
Although there is a strong argument that offshore drilling is an
abnormally dangerous activity, and thus an appropriate subject for
a strict liability standard, there is a need to examine how the doc-
trine of strict liability has been applied in some prior international
disputes.48 Assuming that the dispute arising out of the Campeche
Bay blow-out will ultimately be between the United States and
Mexico for damages from the spill, these prior international
disputes will reveal how the doctrine of strict liability has been ac-
45. 205 Cal. at 331, 270 P. at 954.
46. Id. at 334, 270 P. at 955.
47. Id. at 333-34, 270 P. at 955 (emphasis added).
48. The disputes which will be examined are the Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941), the Corfu Channel Case, 1947 I.C.J. 4, and the United
States Ex Gratia Payments to Japan, 32 DEP'T STATE BULL. 90 (1955).
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cepted, if at all, 49 as a viable standard to be used in the resolution
of extraterritorial injuries.
B. Trail Smelter Arbitration
The Trail Smelter Arbitration between the United States and
Great Britain 50 (on behalf of Canada) arose out of a complaint by
the United States that the emission of sulfur dioxide fumes by a
zinc smelter works in British Columbia poisoned fisheries, trees
used for lumber, trees used for fruit growing, and livestock in the
state of Washington. 51 The case went to arbitration pursuant to the
Ottawa Convention between the United States and the Dominion
of Canada. 52 The Tribunal, established by the Ottawa Convention,
answered four questions which the parties believed to be relevant
for a resolution of the problem. 53 In answering these questions
the Tribunal recommended that the smelter be held to a stringent
standard of proof for injuries caused by the smelter's operations.54
49. "Although the development of international law doctrines of strict liability
may still be, to a large extent, de lege ferenda, there would appear to be, here and
now, a considerable weight of opinion favoring their reception to provide the rules
of decision in certain fields of international relations." See Goldie, Liability for
Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L COM. L.Q.
1189, 1225 (1965).
50. In effect, the Trail Smelter Arbitration was between a Canadian smelter
company and the United States but the dispute was elevated to a state versus state
level pursuant to a Convention between the United States and the then Dominion of
Canada signed at Ottawa, April 15, 1935 and ratified by the parties at Ottawa on Au-
gust 3, 1935. Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of
Smelter at Trail, B.C., signed April 15, 1935, ratifications exchanged, Aug. 3, 1935,
United States-Dominion of Canada, reprinted in 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1907 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Ottawa Convention].
51. 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911, 1911-22 (1935).
52. Ottawa Convention, supra note 50.
53. The following is a list of four questions addressed by the Tribunal:
(1) Whether damage caused by the Trail Smelter in the State of Washington
has occurred since the first day in January, 1932, and if so, what indemnity
should be paid therefor?
(2) In the event of the answer to the first part of the preceding question be-
ing in the affirmative, whether the Trail Smelter should be required to re-
frain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the future and, if
so, to what extent?
(3) In the light of the answer to the preceding question, what measures or
rhgime, if any, should be adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter?
(4) What indemnity or compensation, if any, should be paid on account of
any decision or decisions rendered by the Tribunal pursuant to the next two
preceding questions?
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1939.
54. The Tribunal stated:
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In addition, in determining if liability should exist for future harm,
the Tribunal advocated that indemnity should be paid despite the
fact that there might be full compliance with the r6gime.5 5 The
language used by the Tribunal points to the development of a con-
cept of liability without fault.56
There is at least one school of thought, however, which differs
from this particular interpretation of the Trail Smelter Arbitra-
tion. 57 This contrary view claims that as the Tribunal did not have
to decide "in an either/or sense,"58 between a standard of strict lia-
bility and negligence, the case should not be construed to promul-
gate a standard of strict liability to settle future disputes concerning
pollution-related injuries. This argument, however, fails to confront
the imposition of liability for future claims against the smelter
"notwithstanding the maintenance of the r6gime."5 9 This language
alludes to a notion of liability regardless of whether there was any
intentional or negligent conduct on the part of the Canadian corpo-
ration for any future pollution-related injury in the United States
caused by the smelter. Trail Smelter, in this respect, represents a
• . . under the principles of international law, as well as of the laws of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965. Note that the effect of using a strict liability standard
rather than a negligence standard is to shift the burden of proof from the plaintiff to
the defendant. If the defendant fails to show that the injury was caused by some
"Act of God" or fault of the plaintiff's then the defendant will be held liable. See
Sweeney, Oil Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 174-77 (1968).
55. The Tribunal set up a r6gime consisting of two technical consultants as
well as a meteorologist adequately trained to make periodic observations concerning
effects of emitting gases on the environment. This meteorologist was to be employed
at the Smelter. In addition, the Tribunal was to meet at least once in 1939 to check
to see that the maximum emission standards established were being complied with.
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1934-36.
56. The Tribunal stated:
[i]f any damage as defined under Question No. 2 shall have occurred since
October 1, 1940, or shall occur in the future, whether through failure on the
part of the Smelter to comply with the regulations herein prescribed or
notwithstanding the maintenance of the r6gime, an indemnity shall be paid
for such damage ....
3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1980 (emphasis added).
57. See Hardy, International Protection Against Nuclear Risks, 10 INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 739, 751 (1961).
58. Id.
59. See note 56 supra.
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departure from the traditional use of a negligence standard60 to
impose liability for extraterritorial injuries.
C. The Corfu Channel Case
In the Corfu Channel6' dispute between Albania and Great
Britain, the Albanians refused to grant the British a right of inno-
cent passage through the North Corfu Strait. After the Albanians
reiterated their position, the British sent two cruisers and two de-
stroyers to test the conviction of the Albanians to carry out their
threats that they would fire upon any intruding British ship. 62 When
these ships entered the Strait, they were damaged severely by
mines of unknown origin. 63 As a result of this incident, the British
sent a large force of minesweepers into Albanian waters with the
intent of cleaning the Strait of any other possible mines.6 4 These
vessels uncovered many other mines of German make. 65 As a re-
sult of this discovery, the British submitted the case to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice 66 to rule on whether they had a right of in-
nocent passage in the North Corfu Strait and whether they should
be compensated by the Albanian government for damage to their
vessels and for injuries sustained by their crew members. 67 The In-
ternational Court handed down a three part decision. First, the
Court held that Albania, where it had knowledge of the presence
of a minefield in its territorial waters, had a duty to warn an ap-
proaching British squadron of the danger and, for its failure to do
so, was responsible for the resulting damage and loss of life and
was obligated to pay compensation to the United Kingdom. 68 Sec-
ond, the Court decided that the passage of British ships through
the North Corfu Channel was permissible and not a violation of Al-
60. For an example of a traditional negligence case which employs the four ba-
sic elements of a negligence cause of action-duty, breach of that duty, proximate
cause, and injury-see Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928).
61. United Kingdom v. Albania (Corfu Channel Case) [1948] I.C.J. 4, reprinted
in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE OPINION
BRIEFS 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OPINION BRIEFS].





67. Id. at 2.
68. Id.
CAMPECHE BAY OIL SPILL
banian sovereignty. 69 Third, the Court determined that the unilat-
eral decision by the British to sweep the remaining mines after the
initial incident was a violation of Albanian sovereignty. 70
Although the elements of a negligence cause of action 7' were
never proved here per se, the International Court did rely on the
Albanian's omission to warn the British as a basis for finding
Albania negligent. There is authority for the belief that the Corfu
Channel Case strikes a severe blow to the existence of a standard
of strict liability in international law.72 The case, however, is signif-
icant in any discussion of strict liability for offshore drilling mishaps
because of the International Court's imputation of knowledge to
Albania concerning the existence of the mines without actual proof
of such knowledge. 73 By analogy, parties involved in offshore drill-
ing operations undertake these lawful enterprises with the knowl-
edge that if an accident occurs, damage to the environment will
ensue. If knowledge of a dangerous situation was sufficient in Corfu
Channel to establish a basis of liability, then parties involved in the
abnormally dangerous activity of oil drilling should be treated simi-
larly. Although this case does not show that strict liability has been
accepted as a viable standard in customary international law74 for
imposing liability for abnormally dangerous activities, the effect of
the case is to impute knowledge to parties engaged in dangerous
activities without actual proof of their negligence.
D. Ex Gratia Payments to Japan
A third dispute concerning extraterritorial injury involving two
sovereign nations was the Japanese Fisheries case. In March and
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2-3.
71. See note 60 supra.
72. Hardy, supra note 57, at 758.
73. See Goldie, International Principles of Responsibility for Pollution, 9
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283 (1970). Basically there was no malevolence or neglect
which would have had to been proven by the United Kingdom. Id. at 307.
74. Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit or us-
age; it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. There
must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some form of
sanction will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the transgressor. Evi-
dence that a custom in this sense exists in the international sphere can be
found only by examining the practice of states; that is to say, we must look
at what states do in their relations with one another and attempt to under-
stand why they do it ....
J. BRIERLY, supra note 13, at 59-60.
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April of 1954, the United States conducted atmospheric nuclear
tests at the Pacific Proving Grounds in the Marshall Islands. 75 A
problem developed, however, when certain Japanese fishermen
near the Marshall Islands were injured severely as a result of these
tests. The subsequent question which arose was on what basis of li-
ability, if any, should the United States be held liable. After a dip-
lomatic exchange of notes, 76 the United States on January 4, 1955
agreed ex gratia to compensate the Japanese for their injuries
which were caused by the fallout from the atmospheric tests. 77 As
the note from United States Ambassador Allison indicates, the
United States never attempted to resolve the question of liability
in this case. 78 By making ex gratia payments, the United States in
effect accepted responsibility without any proof of negligence.
Thus, the skirting of the liability issue leaves open the question of
whether a strict liability standard should be utilized to settle such
international disputes. Although the question of liability in this
case was unresolved, these payments to Japan were symbolic of the
United States adherence to the traditional doctrine of sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas.79 This principle does not choose between a
standard of strict liability or a negligence standard per se but it is
useful in establishing the principle that a nation should bear re-
sponsibility for those acts which cause injury to another nation.
The payments to Japan seem to be an indication that the United
States would bear responsibility for damage caused while engaged
in an abnormally dangerous activity8" without proof of negligence. Ab-
75. 32 DEP'T STATE BULL. 90 (1955). Although atmospheric testing is now
banned by the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, at the time of these tests, nuclear atmos-
pheric testing was an accepted practice in international affairs.
76. Id.
77. In United States Ambassador Allison's Note to Japanese Deputy Prime
Minister and Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigenistsu, the following was stated:
I now desire to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United
States of America hereby tenders, ex gratia, to the Government of Japan
without reference to the question of legal liability, the sum of two million
dollars for purposes of compensation for the injuries or damages sustained as
a result of nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands in 1954.
id, 78. Id.
79. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
80. If the same analysis using the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) factors is carried
through for the testing of nuclear weapons as was done for offshore drilling, there is
little doubt that the former as well as the latter will be considered an abnormally
CAMPECHE BAY OIL SPILL
sent political factors, a United States demand for reciprocal treat-
ment for similar extraterritorial injuries caused by another nation's
engagement in an abnormally dangerous activity would not be
unreasonable. I"
III. OIL POLLUTION CAUSED BY VESSELS
A. History
In examining how the international community should handle
the problem of liability for offshore drilling accidents, it may be
beneficial to consider the analogous problem of pollution caused by
vessels. Not only has the marine environment been threatened by
the discharges of oil from vessels in the ordinary course of their
voyages but ocean life has suffered additionally with the era of the
supertanker. 82 The rise in the amount of exported oil creates a
higher probability that accidents will occur. 83 As a result of the in-
creased evidence of vessel-related spills, the international commu-
nity has met several times in the last thirty years to discuss various
safeguards to protect the marine environment. 84
dangerous activity because of the inability to remove the high level of risk involved.
See note 21 supra.
81. An example of how reciprocity works in international law is the most fa-
vored nation (MFN) status awarded to certain nations concerning trade agreements.
The rationale behind (MFN) is simple, "if every country observes the principle, all
countries will benefit in the long run through the resulting more efficient use of re-
sources." SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., THE MOST FAVORED
NATION PROVISION 1 (Comm. Print 1973).
82. As the quantity and capacity of the tankers increase, it is apparent that the
magnitude of their accidents will also increase. To show the growth in oil exports, it
is interesting to note that the percentage of the oil exported in 1938 compared to that
consumed worldwide was 34% while in 1973, 61% of all oil consumed was exported.
R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 30, at 15.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships, I.M.C.O. Doc. MP/CONF/WP. 35, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIALS 1319 (1973); International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casaulities, Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765,
T.I.A.S. 8068, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Intervention Convention]; International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage, Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Liability Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, Ge-
neva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Interna-
tional Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, May 12,
1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
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B. Effect of Treaties Concerning Oil Pollution
Caused by Ships
These international treaties were designed to put pressure on
nations transporting oil to curb pollution of the oceans by vessel
discharge in particular8 5 and vessel accidents in general. 86 Oil, al-
though the main culprit in the world's eye after such disasters as
the Torrey Canyon8 7 and the Santa Barbara Oil Spill 8 was not
viewed as the only possible threat to the marine environment.
An examination of Article 25 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas reveals that the international community was also fearful of
the dumping of radioactive wastes and other harmful agents.8 9 Al-
though this 1958 Convention dealt solely with vessels as the modus
operandi for pollution, the rationale, i.e., the protection of the en-
vironment, is still a continuing goal of the international community
today.
In particular, the International Convention Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 90
should be examined closely. At Brussels, the parties to this con-
vention reaffirmed a conscious awareness that the marine environ-
ment was being threatened by oil pollution, but went further by
saying that there was a need to take "measures of an exceptional
character" to protect the high seas. 91 Basically, the parties to this
convention were given the power to take all reasonable steps nec-
essary to protect their "coastline or related interests" 9 2 from danger
caused by the threat of oil pollution. The parties, however, were
careful not to establish a carte blanche right of intervention and
specifically limited all measures to combat pollution by requiring
the steps taken to be commensurate to the damage threatened. 93
85. For an in-depth analysis of operational discharge from a vessel, see Teclaff,
Controlling Operational Oil Pollution from Ships, in 1977 FORDHAM CORPORATE
LAW INSTITUTE, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME REGULATION 477 (J. Sweeney ed.
1978).
86. R. M'GONIGLE & M. ZACHER, supra note 30, at 16-20.
87. Id. at 20.
88. See note 22 supra.
89. Article 25(2) of the Geneva Conference of 1958 states: "All States shall
cooperate with the competent international organizations in taking measures for the
prevention of pollution of the seas or air space above, resulting from any activities
with radioactive materials or other harmful agents." 13 U.S.T. at 2319, T.I.A.S. No.
5200 at __, 450 U.N.T.S. at 96.
90. Intervention Convention, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. Id. art. I(1).
93. Id. art. V.
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As far as the question of liability was concerned, there was a com-
panion agreement signed, also at Brussels, on the same day. 94 This
agreement was designed to codify international rules relating to
questions of liability and compensation for damage caused by the
"escape and/or discharge" of oil from ships.9 5 Although "escape"
was not defined specifically in the Convention, its presence broad-
ens the area of liability to cover all tanker accidents which result in
oil being freed into the marine environment. The crux of this lia-
bility convention was to establish a standard of strict liability for
pollution caused by the release of oil by ships into the high seas.96
As an outgrowth9 7 of this liability convention, The Interna-
tional Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage was held at Brussels in
1971.98 In short, the focus was to create a fund which could be
used to ease the burden which had been imposed on shipowners
under the Liability Convention of 1969. 99 With a standard of strict
liability for oil pollution caused by ships in effect, the international
community did not want to create such harsh conditions as to un-
duly discourage shipowners from the vital transport of oil around
the globe. Thus, the 1971 Convention was implemented to alleviate
those fears of the shipowners by creating a relief fund which could
be used to ease the possible financial hardships imposed by strict
liability.
CONCLUSION
If the Mexican government had followed the United States
precedent in the Japanese Fisheries case, the question of which
theory of liability the Mexicans should be held to would be moot.
Although their refusal to compensate those injured by the spill is
contrary to the recognized doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum non
94. Liability Convention, supra note 84 and accompanying text.
95. Id.
96. Art. III of the Liability Convention states: "[tlhe owner of a ship at the
time of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences . . . shall
be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been dis-
charged from the ship as a result of the incident." Liability Convention, supra note
84, art. III.
97. One of the resolutions ratified by the parties to the Liability Convention
was to draft a scheme to establish an international fund to lessen the heavy burden
caused by strict liability for pollution causing accidents. See 9 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIALS at 66-67 (1970).
98. 11 INT'L LEGAL MATEIALS 284 (1972).
99. Id.
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laedas, this refusal at last may serve to initiate some type of multi-
lateral liability convention in order to establish a set of definitive
rules governing liability for offshore drilling accidents in particular
and other pollution-related extraterritorial injuries in general. If
such a convention were to take place, an approach similar to the
one taken by the Brussels Liability Convention imposing strict lia-
bility for oil pollution by ships should be recommended. One rea-
son to avoid using a fault standard in offshore drilling accidents is
that the party doing the drilling is not likely to be overly co-
operative in making relevant evidence available to the injured
party. This evidentiary problem is compounded by the fact that the
rigs themselves, which might have been defective, are often lost in
the depths of the oceans after such explosions and are not likely
subjects for analysis. Perhaps the most compelling reason to em-
ploy a strict liability standard, however, is the fact that there is no
justifiable reason to have a different standard of liability for ship-
related pollution and rig-related pollution of the environment by
the freeing of oil. With the major concern of the international com-
munity being the protection of the environment from harmful
agents such as oil, the fact that there is a difference in modus
operandi between ships and offshore drilling rigs should be second-
ary. Given the acceptance of strict liability in the Trail Smelter Ar-
bitration, the utilization of such a standard in the pending litigation
surrounding the Campeche Bay blow-out could foster greater
usage of this doctrine in international law. By making nations lia-
ble for environmental accidents caused by offshore drilling without
proof of fault, those nations involved in an abnormally dangerous
activity such as offshore drilling might reevaluate their policies thus
averting future environmental catastrophies.
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